This work analyzes the adverse effects of cyberphysical attacks on discrete-time distributed multi-agent systems, and proposes a mitigation approach for attacks on sensors and actuators. First, we show how an attack on a single node snowballs into a network-wide attack and even destabilizes the entire system. Next, to overcome the adversarial effects of attacks on sensors and actuators, a distributed adaptive attack compensator is designed by estimating the normal expected behavior of agents. The adaptive attack compensator is augmented with the controller and it is shown that the proposed controller achieves secure consensus in the presence of the attacks on sensors and actuators. No restrictive assumption on the number of agents under adversarial input is assumed. Moreover, it recovers compromised agents under actuator attacks and avoids propagation of attacks on sensors without discarding information from the compromised agents. Finally, numerical simulations validate the effectiveness of the presented theoretical contributions on a network of Sentry autonomous underwater vehicles.
I. INTRODUCTION
A CYBER-PHYSICAL system (CPS) refers to a class of engineering systems that integrates the cyber aspect of computation and communication elements with physical entities. Based on their control objectives CPSs can be categorized into two classes, namely distributed multi-agent systems (DMASs) and centralized networked control systems (CNCSs). The control objective in DMAS is to achieve a coordinated or synchronized motion or behavior through the exchange of local information among agents [1] . On the other hand, the control objective in CNCS, for which the feedback loops are closed through a communication network, is to regulate the system's output to a desired value or trajectory [2] . DMASs and CNCSs are both prone to cyber-physical attacks and corruption of sensory data or manipulation of actuators' inputs, which can severely and adversely affect their performance. Thus, it is of vital importance to design resilient control approaches that can mitigate attacks and ensure an acceptable level of functionality despite attacks. Manuscript 
A. Related Work
In the existing literature, mitigation and detection approaches have been presented for resilient control of CNCS [3] - [8] . For DMAS, which is the problem of interest in this letter, various approaches have also been presented for detection and mitigation of attacks (see for example [9] - [20] ). To mitigate attacks, several elegant results are presented in [9] - [14] that use weighted mean-subsequence-reduced (W-MSR) approach in which the cooperative agents remove the F-largest and the F-smallest values received from their neighbors without identifying compromised agents. Although these results can cope with a variety of attacks, the compromised agents are implicitly removed from the network, because normal agents discard the information they receive from compromised agents. If possible, however, it is desired to recover compromised agents, then bring them back to the network without harming network connectivity. In [15] - [16] , authors presented resilient algorithms for flocking and active target tracking applications in robotics, respectively. The work presented in [15] ensures a resilient consensus if the network connectivity is greater than a resilience threshold with assumption that a compromised agent can share wrong information, but the actuator always works properly. The network connectivity constraints on the graph topology are relaxed in [17] by including trusted nodes. Most of these approaches do not make any restriction on the source of the attack and include attacks on sensors, actuators and communication networks. However, as shown in this letter, attacks only on sensors and actuators can be recovered and compromised agents can be brought back to the network without harming network connectivity. This avoids any unnecessary harm to network connectivity. Besides the above-mentioned approaches, adaptive and robust resilient control protocols are designed to directly mitigate attacks, mainly using game theory [19] and adaptive control [20] . Most of these results are presented for continuous-time systems. However, in real-time applications, the system communicates and broadcasts their information at discrete instants.
B. Contributions
This letter presents a thorough attack analysis and proposes a mitigation approach for attacks on sensors and actuators for discrete-time DMASs with linear structures. The main contributions are listed as follows. specific types of attack while they are far from the synchronization. Therefore, existing robust control approaches such as H ∞ that aim at minimizing the local neighborhood tracking error can no longer mitigate these types of attacks, r Based on the results of attack analysis, to mitigate the effect of attacks on sensors and actuators, an observer-like anomaly detector is first designed which provides the expected normal behavior of the agents when there is no attack. Then, an adaptive attack compensator is designed and augmented with the controller to mitigate attacks without discarding information from compromised or unattacked neighbors'. We show that the consensus error is uniformly bounded using the proposed controller in the presence of the attack, and the bound can be made arbitrarily small. The proposed adaptive resilient control protocol requires less restrictive requirements on the graph topology compared to most of the existing resilient distributed control results. Moreover, not only the synchronization is achieved in the presence of actuator attacks, but also compromised agents are recovered. On the other hand, attacks on sensors affect only compromised agents without being propagated in the network. Attacks on communication networks can be stealthier and cannot be mitigated by our proposed approach. Although not considered in this letter, attacks on the communication links can be identified and removed integrating our approach with existing resilient methods presented in [9] - [14] . A significant advantage is that our proposed approach recovers attacks on sensors and actuators without discarding them and thus preserves the network connectivity.
II. NOTATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES

A. Graph Theory
A directed graph G consists of a pair (V, E) in which set of nodes and set of edges are represented by V = v 1 , . . . , v N and E ⊂ V × V, respectively. The adjacency matrix is defined
is known as the in-degree matrix, with j∈N i a ij as the weighted in-degree of node i. A node is called as a root node if it can reach all other nodes of the graph G through a directed path. A directed tree is an acyclic digraph with a root node, such that any other node of the digraph can be reached by one and only one directed path starting at the root node. A graph is said to have a spanning tree if a subset of the edges forms a directed tree. Throughout the letter, λ(.) represents the eigenvalues of a matrix. (.) adj and ker(.) denote adjoint of a matrix and the null space. Furthermore, λ max (.) and λ min (.) represent maximum and minimum eigenvalue of matrix, respectively. diag(.) denotes the diagonal matrix. If A is an m × n matrix, with a ij being its i − th row and j − th column entry, and B is a p × q matrix, then the Kronecker product A ⊗ B is the mp × nq block matrix given by
Assumption 1: The directed graph G has a spanning tree. This assumption is a minimum requirement for the graph to guarantee consensus even in the absence of the attack [21] , [22] .
B. Standard Distributed Consensus in MAS
Consider the DMAS with N agents having identical system dynamics represented by (1) where x i (k) ∈ R n and u i (k) ∈ R m are the state and control input of agent i, respectively. A and B are the system and input matrices, respectively. (A, B) is assumed to be stabilizable.
Define the local neighborhood tracking error for the agent i as
Consider the distributed control law for node i as [21] 
where c is a positive coupling gain and K ∈ R m×n is a control gain, designed to gaurantee that agents reach consensus, i.e.,
Then, by substituting the controller u i (k) from (3) into the system dynamics (1), the global dynamics of DMAS can be expressed as [22] x(k
Then, the solution to (4) is given by
whereL is the normalized graph Laplacian matrix defined as [21] 
Let the eigenvalues ofL be λ i , ∀ i = 1, . . . , N. Then, λ i lies inside the unit circle centered at 1 + j0 for i = 2, . . . , N and λ 1 = 0 [22] . Lemma 1 ( [22] ): Let R ⊂ V be the set of root nodes and r = [p 11 , . . . , p 1 N ] T be the left eigenvector ofL for λ 1 = 0. Then, p 1i > 0 if i ∈ R and p 1i = 0 if i / ∈ R. Theorem 1 ([21] , [22] ): Let feedback gain K be designed such that A − cλ i BK is Schur stable for i = 2, . . . , N. Then, DMAS reaches consensus and the final consensus value can be written as
III. ATTACK ANALYSIS FOR DISCRETE-TIME DMAS
In this section, we model false-data injection attack on sensors and actuators, and analyze its adverse effects on DMASs.
Attacks on actuators of agent i can be modeled as
where u i is the control law given in (3), u a i represents the attacker's signal injected into the actuator of agent i, u c i is the distorted control law applied to (1) and the scalar γ i is 1 when there is an attack on actuators of agent i and 0, otherwise.
Attacks on sensors of agent i can be modeled as
where x i represents the state of agent i, x a i is the attacker's signal injected into the sensor of agent i, x c i is the distorted state and the scalar δ i is 1 when there is an attack on sensors of agent i and 0, otherwise. Based on the distributed control law (3), and using (8) and (9) in (1), one can express the DMAS dynamics for an agent i as
where f i (k) represents the overall attack signal injected into the agent i, which is given by
for some l ≥ 0, i.e., there is a directed path of length l + 1 from node j to node i. Definition 2 (Compromised and unattacked Agent): We call an agent that is directly under attack as a compromised agent. An agent is called unattacked if it is not compromised. We denote the set of agents as N Int , i.e., N Int = N\N Comp where N Comp denotes the set of compromised agents.
In the control systems, the internal model principle (IMP) states that the controller must incorporate a model of the dynamics that generate the signals which the control system is supposed to track. We show in Theorem 2 that the attacker can also leverage the IMP and incorporate some eigenvalues of the consensus dynamics in its attack design to destabilize the entire network.
Definition 3 (IMP-based and non-IMP-based Attacks): Let the attacker designs its attack signal f i (k) on sensors and/or actuators of the compromised agent i as
with W ∈ R m×m as the attacker's dynamic. Define
as the set of eigenvalues of W and the system dynamics matrix A, respectively. Then, if Λ W ⊆ Λ A , the attack signal is called the IMP-based attack. Otherwise, if Λ W ⊂ Λ A or the attacker has no dynamics (e.g. a random signal), it is called a non-IMP based attack. Remark 1: Note that, in this letter, attack signals are not restricted to IMP-based attacks that are designed based on the dynamics (12) . Attacks are categorized into two classes in Definition 3 based on their effects on the network stability and it will be shown that IMP-based attacks can destabilize the network while non-IMP based attacks cannot. The non-IMP based attacks cover a broad range of attacks. The proposed resilient approach presented in section IV works for both IMP and non-IMP based attacks.
Remark 2: Note that if the attack is only on actuators of the agent i, i.e., f i (k) = u a i (k), then the attacker can design u a i (k) = W f i (k − 1), as an IMP-based attack signal that follows dynamics in (12) . If the attack is only on the sensor of the agent i, then f i (k) = −c(1 + h i ) −1 Kx a i (k) and the attacker can design x a i (k) = W f i (k − 1), to follow the dynamics in (12) . Note that the scalar coefficient cannot change the common mode of the dynamics. Hence, (12) can be implemented for attacks both on sensors and actuators.
We assume that the system matrix A in (1) is marginally stable, with eigenvalues on the unit circle centered at the origin. This is a standard assumption in the literature for consensus and synchronization problems [23] . Define
where p 1j represents the element of left eigenvector corresponding to zero eigenvalue ofL. S(k) in (14) is used in Theorem 2 to analyze the effects of attack on root nodes and non-root nodes. Note that S(k) = N j=1 p 1j f j (k) represents the product of the left eigenvector corresponding to the zero eigenvalue of the graph Laplacian matrixL and the attack vector f (k). Based on Lemma 1, elements of the left eigenvector corresponding to non-root nodes are zero. Thus, for a non-root node, S(k) = 0 regardless of attack. On the other hand, the left eigenvector corresponding to root nodes are non-zero and thus S(k) = 0 if there is an attack on a root node.
Theorem 2: Consider the DMAS (10) under the attack f i (k) with the control protocol (3). Let f i (k) be designed as (12) . Then, 1) An IMP-based attack destabilizes the complete network, if S(k) = 0, i.e., if attack is on a root node. 2) Any non-IMP based attack or IMP-based attack with S(k) = 0 deviates agents from the desired consensus behavior but does not cause instability, if agents are reachable from the compromised one. Proof: The transfer function for the DMAS (1), from x i (z) to u i (z), in Z-domain, can be written as
Using (3), the global control law under the influence of the attack can be expressed as
with
Using (15) and (16), the system state in the global form can be written as
where G(z) ∈ R n×m . Let M be a non-singular matrix such thatL = M ΛM −1 , with Λ be the Jordan canonical form of L. The left and the right eigenvectors ofL corresponding to the zero eigenvalue are r and 1 N , respectively [22] . Define
Defining a state transformation asx(z) = (M −1 ⊗ I n )x(z) and premultiplying (18) 
Let assume for simplicity that all the Jordan blocks are simple, i.e.,
where p ij and m ij represent the elements of matrices M −1 and M . Then, for the agent i, using (19) and the fact that the first eigenvalue ofL is zero and its corresponding right eigenvector is 1 N i.e. m i1 = 1, one has
We now show that [I n + cKG(z)λ h ] −1 is Schur and thus to check stability of agents under attacks, one needs to analyze the first term of (20) . Towards this end, since (A − cλ h BK), ∀h = 2, . . . , N is Schur, therefore if we show that the roots of the characteristic polynomial (A − cλ h BK) are identical to the poles of
To this end, using (15) , one has
Hence, this proves that the roots of the characteristic polynomial
To analyze the boundedness of the first term in (20) , note that according to Lemma 1, N j=1 p 1j f j (k) in (20) , which is identical to S(k) in (14), is zero for an attack on non-root nodes and is nonzero if the attack is launched on root nodes. Consider now an IMP-based attack on a root node. Then, using the transfer function (15) and the attack signal defined in (12) , one can write (20) as
with λ A l as the marginal eigenvalue of the system dynamics A, i.e., λ A l lies on the unit circle centered at the origin. Since the first term of (22) shows that the pole λ A l lies on the unit circle centered at the origin and has multiplicity greater than 1 due to IMP-based attacks, thus the system states tend to infinity as k → ∞. Therefore, attacks on root nodes destabilize the entire network in the sense that the state of all agents goes to infinity as time tends to infinity. This completes the proof of part 1.
To prove part 2, note that based on Lemma 1, if the attack is on a non-root node, then S(k) = N j=1 p 1j f j (k) is zero. Therefore, the first term in (20) becomes zero and it can be expressed as
According to (21) , [I n + cKG(z)λ h ] −1 is Schur stable. Therefore, based on (23), and since agent i is unattacked itself, which concludes G(z) is also Schur, the system states are bounded, even in the presence of attacks. However, although agents that are reachable from a compromised agent show a stable behavior, their states deviate from the desired consensus value based on the result of Theorem 1 in [26] . This completes the proof.
Disturbance attenuation approaches focus on minimizing the effects of disturbance on the local neighborhood tracking error [24] . More specifically, the H ∞ approach for DMAS (1) in presence of disturbance w i (k) designs a distributed control protocol as in (3), such that the desired consensus is achieved as in (7), if disturbance w i (k) = 0 and the bounded L 2 -gain condition is fulfilled for any disturbance
where γ > 0 is attenuation constant,M andN are positive definite weight matrices. Lemma 2: Consider the normalized graph Laplacian matrix L defined in (6) . Then, [L TL − 2L] is negative semidefinite.
Proof: Let λ k be the eigenvalue of the normalized graph Laplacian matrixL. So, the eigenvalue of [L TL − 2L] for a undirected graph can be written as
Since all eigenvalues of matrixL lie inside unit circle centered at 1 + j0, except λ 1 = 0 [22] , therefore (λ k − 1) 2 − 1 is less than or equal to zero for k = 1, . . . , N. This shows that [L TL − 2L] is negative semidefinite. In the following theorem, for the sake of simplicity, we consider the single integrator dynamics in global form given by
Under the influence of attack, one can write the control input u(k) in (26) as
Theorem 3: Consider the DMAS with single integrator dynamics (26) . Assume that the system is under a constant attack signal f (k). Then, ε i (k) → 0, ∀i ∈ N Int while agents do not reach the desired consensus.
Proof: Consider the Lyapunov function for the discrete-time DMAS as 
After simplifying (29) and based on Lemma 2, one has
Then, using Lasalle's invariance principle [25] , the trajectories (x(k), f(k)) converge to a set that satisfies ΔV (x(k), f(k)) = 0. Based on (30), this yields
From (31), one has (−Lx(k) + f (k)) =c1 N . According to this, the single integrator system dynamics becomes x i (k + 1) = x i (k) +c, which shows that it destabilizes the system. Therefore, x i (k) → ∞ as k → ∞ ∀i = 1, . . . , N while the local neighborhood tracking error goes to zero for all agent. Note that based on Theorem 2, (32) is the possible case when the attack is on a root node. On the other hand, for an attack on a non-root node, from (32), one has (−Lx(k) + f (k)) = 0. Since for the unattacked agent i, f i (k) = 0, therefore, the local neighborhood tracking error for unattacked agents converge to zero, even in the presence of the attack. We now show that unattacked agents do not reach the desired consensus, despite the fact the local neighborhood tracking error is zero. From (32), one hasLx(k) = f (k) which can be written for agent i as
For a compromised agent i, since f i (k) = 0, then, one has x i (k) = x j (k) for some i, j. Now assume that agent i is unattacked, i.e., f i (k) = 0. Then, based on (33), one has
Consider the unattacked agent i as an immediate neighbor of the compromised agent i c . Let assume by contradiction that only the compromised agent does not reach the desired consensus but all the unattacked agents reach the desired consensus. Using (34), one can write
Assuming that unattacked agents reach consensus,
and this contradicts the assumption. Therefore, this shows that the unattacked agent i is deviated from the desired consensus value. Similarly, one can use the same argument to show that all reachable agents from the compromised agent deviate from the desired consensus value. This completes the proof. Corollary 1: Let the attacker design its attack signal using the IMP-based approach described in Theorem 2. Then, it bypasses the H ∞ control protocol.
Proof: In the absence of the attack, minimizing the local neighborhood tracking error results in minimizing the consensus error. Therefore, the H ∞ control in (24) is used to attenuate the effect of adversarial input on the local neighborhood tracking error. However, according to Theorem 3, in the presence of IMP attack, by making the local neighborhood tracking error go to zero, agents do not reach consensus. This completes the proof.
IV. RESILIENT DISTRIBUTED CONTROL PROTOCOL FOR ATTACKS ON SENSOR AND ACTUATOR : AN ADAPTIVE APPROACH
In this section, the expected normal behavior of each agent is predicted using an observer-like predictor (called here expected state predictor), which employs the agent's dynamics to predict its expected normal state at each time step. This expected state predictor does not use any actual state measurement, and, instead, calculates the expected normal state of the agent based on the evolution rule of its dynamics, and taking into account the local information it receives from its neighbors. Then, a distributed adaptive compensator is designed using predicted behavior of agents to compensate for any discrepancy between the actual state and its predicted normal one.
Consider the estimated state for agent i asx i (k). The distributed expected state predictor is designed aŝ
(36) where the gain K and the coupling coefficient c are to be designed to ensure A c in (5) is Schur. The global expected state predictor state vector for (36) can be written asx
Consider the N expected state predictors given in (36). Let the feedback gain K and the coupling coefficient c are designed to ensure A c in (5) is Schur. Then, the expected state predictor statex(k) converges to the desired consensus value.
Proof: The designed expected state predictor in (36) can be expressed asx
whereû i (k) = cKε i (k) with the local neighborhood tracking errorε(k) asε
One can write the global expected state predictor state dynamics asx(k + 1) = A cx (k) ∈ R nN which yieldsx(k) = A k cx (0) ∈ R nN . As A − cλ i BK is Schur stable, with λ i be the eigenvalues of the normalized graph Laplacian matrixL for i = 2, . . . , N and λ 1 = 0. Therefore, the expected state predictor states achieve the desired consensus value.
Remark 3: Note that a broad class of the DMAS includes the leader-follower or the containment control problem (i.e., DMAS with multiple-leader) for which even if thex i (0) = x i (0), Lemma 3 is valid. This is because, the reference trajectory to be followed by agents is determined only by the leaders, which are assumed to be trusted by using more advanced sensors and investing more security. The system (36) acts as a reference model for the agents and ifx i (0) = x i (0), even for the unattacked DMAS, d i in (42) will be nonzero until the difference between the initial conditions is gone. Agents converge to the desired behavior irrespective of initial values.
We now design a distributed resilient control protocol as
where u i (k) represents the standard control protocol defined in (3) and u i,comp (k) represents the distributed adaptive compensator protocol responsible for rejection of the adversarial input.
Consider the feedback gain K in the control protocol (3) given as
where R 1 is a positive definite design matrix, and P 1 is the solution of
with a positive definite matrix Q 1 .
The designed distributed control protocol is given by
where d i (k) is the estimated response of the adaptive compensator and K is the gain given by (40) and (41). The local neighborhood tracking errorε i (k) in (42) is given bȳ
The update law for the distributed adaptive compensator is designed as
where θ > 0 is a design parameter, andε i (k) andε i (k) are defined in (43) and (38). According to Lemma 3, the expected state predictor converges to the desired consensus value. Therefore, consensus of DMAS can be achieved by showing the convergence of the agent state x i (k) to the predicted statex i (k). Define the consensus error x(k) asx
In the following theorem, we show that the consensus error remains bounded using the proposed resilient adaptive controller.
Theorem 4: Consider the DMAS (10) under attacks on sensors and actuators. Let the control protocol be developed as (42)-(44). Then, the agent's consensus error in (45) is bounded, i.e.,
x(k) ≤ b 0 for some bound b 0 and it can be made arbitrarily small, despite attack.
Proof: According to Lemma 3, the expected state predictor converges to the desired consensus value. Therefore, consensus of discrete-time DMAS can be achieved by showing the convergence of the agent state x i (k) to the predicted statex i (k). Then, with (10) and (37), one can writex(k + 1) as
whered
denotes attack rejection error with d(k) = [d T 1 (k), d T 2 (k), . . . , d T N (k)] T ∈ R nN as the global adaptive compensator vector and the dynamics of the attack f (k) is defined in (12) .
Using (44), the global dynamics of the adaptive compensator can be written as
Note thatf (k) = f (k) only if the actuator of any agent is compromised. Define Q 2 = Q T 2 > 0 as Q 2 = cR 2 (I + H) −1 L = cR 2L with some positive definite matrix R 2 . Let the real part of the minimum eigenvalue of the normalized graph Laplacian matrixL be λ m .
Define the Lyapunov candidate function function as
(49) The difference equation of the Lyapunov candidate function can be written as
Using (46), part 1 of the difference equation of the Lyapunov candidate function (50) can be expressed as
Using the Young's inequality, one can further simplify and express (51) as
where T = K T B T P 1 BK. We now consider the part 2 of the difference equation of the Lyapunov candidate function in (50) as
is a positive definite matrix. Using (47), one can express (53) as
Using the dynamics of the distributed adaptive compensator in (48) with (54), one has
Using the Young's inequality, one can simplify (55) as
where ψ(k) denotes how the value of attack signal changes at next time instant. If the attack signal is constant, i.e., f (k + 1) = f (k), then ψ(k) = 1. Thus, one can infer that ψ(k) is always bounded, i.e., |ψ(k)| < ζ ∀ k. Integrating (52) and (56) with further simplification, one has
One can show that ΔV ≤ 0, if the coupling coefficient satisfies
The design parameter θ can be chosen such θ <
and then, one can ensure the bound in (58). This shows that the agent's consensus error is bounded, i.e., x(k) ≤ b 0 for some bound b 0 . Therefore, the actual agent's state x(k) achieves the desired consensus behavior with a bounded error that can be made arbitrarily small by appropriate selection of the design parameter θ. This completes the proof. Remark 4: The coupling coefficient c needs to be in a certain range which depends on the λ m and λ min (T Q −1 1 ). This condition is standard in the literature of DMAS [21] . On the other hand, the condition for the bound ond(k) in (58) depends on the design parameters θ, and one can select this parameter to satisfy (58) which ensures ΔV ≤ 0. Thus, the bound on consensus error can be made arbitrarily small based on the selection of design parameter θ. Moreover, this bound is conservative, and as shown in the simulation results, the consensus error almost goes to zero.
Remark 5: Compromised agents under the effect of the sensor attack might not be recovered completely and result a nonzero bound in the consensus error defined in (45). The proposed distributed adaptive law compensates the difference between the incoming neighboring sensor measurement (x c i (k)) and the desired statex i (k) and x c i (k) = x i (k) in the case of sensor attack. Under the actuator attack x c i (k) = x i (k) and the bound on the consensus error can be made arbitrarily small. 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We consider a leader-follower network of autonomous underwater vehicle's (AUV's) for the evaluation of the presented results.
The communication network in Fig. 1 considers the Sentry AUVs as agents which are manufactured by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution [27] . The linearized model of the Sentry is of 6 DOF, but it is generally decomposed into four non-interacting subsystems which are speed subsystem (u), the roll subsystem (φ), the steering subsystem (ν, r, ψ), the diving subsystem (ω, q, z, θ). Here, we focus on the diving subsystem of Sentry AUV for the desired depth maneuvering in the leader-follower network. The diving subsystem dynamics of Sentry AUV follows the dynamics in (1) 
represent the heave speed, pitch rate, depth and pitch, and bone and stern plane deflections, respectively.
In the network communication graph, we assumed that the agent 0 represents a active non-autonomous leader which aim to follow a desired sinusoidal depth trajectory and agents 1 to 5 designate the followers. The leader has the control input u 0 (k) = K 0 x 0 (k) + r(k), where K 0 is state feedback gain, x 0 denotes the leader state and r(k) represents the desired sinusoidal trajectory, respectively. Since the leader input is non-zero, slightly different discrete-time control protocol from that the one proposed in the letter is used for which the leader exchanges its input signal u 0 with its neighbors and agents reach consensus by exchanging states and leader's input. This, however, does not change our attack analysis and mitigation. The state feedback gain K 0 = [− 0.18 −2.25 0.13 −0.21; 1.56 5.39 0.49 1.59] Now, the effect of multiple attacks on the network is analyzed. We consider attack on actuators of Agent 2 and Agent 3 with attack signals u a 2 (k) = [30 30] and u a 3 (k) = [20 sin(k) 20sin(k)] , respectively at t = 40 sec. Fig. 2(a) shows that agents which are reachable from compromised Agents 2 and 3 are deviated from the desired behavior. This verifies results of Theorem 2. Then, Fig. 2(b) illustrates the (40) and (41), respectively. The system states achieve the desired consensus behavior, even in the presence of the attack. This result demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed resilient controller in Theorem 4 for multiple attacks. Note that result in Fig. 2(b) also shows that this approach is not limited to particular model of attack and attack signal can be constant or time-varying. Compared to the existing work such as [18] , the presented approach brings back the compromised agents to the network. However, approaches such as [18] work also for attacks on the communication network while the presented approach is limited to attacks on sensors and actuators.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This letter analyzes the effects of attacks for leaderless DMAS and designs an adaptive resilient distributed control protocol for attack mitigation. It is shown that how the IMP-based attack on a root node can destabilize the entire network. To overcome the effect of the attacks on sensors and actuators, a resilient controller is developed based on an expected state predictor. The presented controller shows that the attack on the sensor and actuator can be mitigated without compromising the connectivity of the network and achieves the desired consensus. Although not considered in this letter, attacks on the communication links can be removed by integrating our approach with existing resilient methods presented in [10] , [11] . The presented approach also works for the leader-follower problems in which leaders are assumed to be trusted.
A possible direction for future work is to extend these results to consensus of DMASs with nonlinear dynamics and for the system with output feedback under network uncertainties.
